Intermediate Public Economics, Jean Hindriks and Gareth D. Myles by Gravel, Nicolas
 Économie publique/Public economics 
17 | 2005/2
Varia







IDEP - Institut d'économie publique
Édition imprimée





Nicolas Gravel, « Intermediate Public Economics, Jean Hindriks and Gareth D. Myles », Économie
publique/Public economics [En ligne], 17 | 2005/2, mis en ligne le 14 mai 2007, consulté le 19 avril
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/3376 
© Tous droits réservés
public economics
économiepublique
Revue de l’Institut d’Économie Publique
Deux numéros par an
no 17 – 2005/2
économiepublique sur internet : www.economie-publique.fr
© Institut d’économie publique – IDEP
Centre de la Vieille-Charité
2, rue de la Charité – F-13002 Marseille
Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.
Il est interdit, sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, de reproduire (notamment
par photocopie) partiellement ou totalement le présent ouvrage, de le stocker dans
une banque de données ou de le communiquer au public, sous quelque forme et de
quelque manière que ce soit.
Imprimé en France.
La revue économiepublique bénéficie du soutien du Conseil régional Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur
ISSN 1373-8496




Jean Hindriks and Gareth D. Myles
Nicolas Gravel ∗
This book is a very welcome entrant in the relatively sparse set of “recent”
textbooks in public economics. Aiming an advanced undergraduate student
audience, this book therefore fills the gap between the widely used introductory
undergraduate textbook of Stiglitz (1999) and the graduate level piece of Myles
(1995). The book covers, in its 625 pages and 21 chapters, much of the topics
traditionally studied under the heading of Public Economics. It extends quite
significantly the list of topics covered in Myles (1995) by adding to it asymmetric
information, political economy, rent seeking, local public economics and fiscal
federalism.
Chapters are conveniently grouped into eight thematic sections and each of
them is completed by a rather long list of exercises (424 in the whole book!). The
first section of the book, made of two short chapters, gives a quick presentation of
the field of public economics (chapter 1) as well as the canonical Arrow-Debreu
model and the two welfare theorems (chapter 2). The second section provides an
interesting institutional description of the public sector by means of both historical
and cross-country comparisons (chapter 3) and surveys various theories that
explain the growth in public sector size which has been observed in all countries in
the 20th century (chapter 4). The third section covers the standard “market failures”
that are typically invoked to justify public intervention in the economic sphere.
These are pure public goods (chapter 5), club goods and local public goods (chapter
6), externalities (chapter 7), imperfect competition (chapter 8) and asymmetric
information (chapter 9). The fourth section introduces what one could call the
“political economy” perspective to public economics which, instead of looking
at the best possible public intervention from the view point of some normative
criterion (efficiency, equity, and so on) as would do the “classical approach” to
the problem, tries to predict the likely behavior of the public authorities given
the incentives faced by the actors of the public sector (essentially politicians and
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bureaucrats). Politicians behavior and elections are treated in chapter 10 while
chapter 11 is devoted to rent seeking and lobbying. Section 5 leaves the political
economy perspective and addresses the issue of appraising the equity of various
policies. It does so in chapter 11 which deals with standard welfarist normative
evaluation and in chapter 12 which discusses the issue of income inequality and
poverty measurement. Section 6 covers classical taxation issues such as indirect
taxation (chapter 13), income taxation (chapter 14) and tax evasion (chapter 15).
Section 7 addresses some of the issues that are involved in the coexistence of
several jurisdictions. It especially discusses those issues pertaining to the optimal
choice of the number and the size of government levels (chapter 16) and to fiscal
competition (chapter 17). Finally the last section deals with the intertemporal
dimension of public policies. Are covered in this section the canonical overlapping
generation model (chapter 18), the specific issue of the “pension crisis” and the
social security debt (chapter 20) as well as the design of growth-enhancing policies
(chapter 21, which also discusses the issue of capital taxation).
As can be seen, the choice and range of topics is quite faithful to the common
understanding of public economics as the study of the causes and consequences of
public intervention in the economic sphere. Yet some topics which have clearly to
do with public intervention, like corporate taxation and cost-benefit analysis, are
not treated. Furthermore, a large part of the discussions of imperfect competition
and asymmetric informations that are conducted in the book do not immediately
connect to public intervention and could instead have find their place in a textbook
on industrial organization or on information economics. On this last point, I was in
particular a bit disappointed by the evasive treatment of information asymmetries
that are specific to public intervention. These information asymmetries have been
put on the front scene of academic research by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(not covered in the book) and all the literature on implementation and public
decision in incomplete information. While the book does mention on occasion the
information asymmetries that limit the scope of public intervention (especially in
the chapters of optimal commodity and income taxation and in its discussion of
the Clarke-Grove mechanism for public good), it does not provide an integrated
treatment of these “public economics specific” information asymmetries. It seems
to me that such an integrated treatment could have been provided in chapter 9,
even at the cost of leaving the task of presenting the more standard material on
moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance to textbooks on information and
insurance economics.
But these are rather minor departures from what would have been, in my view,
an optimal choice of topics covered by a textbook in public economics. And to
this respect, the book is quite close indeed to my ideal point.
With some exceptions, the general approach to the topics and the style of the
book is academic, and follows rather closely the relevant recent literature. To
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that extent, the book’s approach to public economics differs significantly from,
say, that of Stiglitz (1999) who adopts a more casual and down-to-earth style
based on current public policy issues and who uses academic knowledge to shed
light to these issues. Yet the academic style of the book is developed with what
I would be tempted to call a rather casual use of mathematics. Assumptions of
the models are not always spelled out completely and some of the results, stated
sometimes as theorems, are expressed without the assumptions under which they
hold. While this casual mathematical style may have the advantage of easing the
reader’s access to the main intuitive results of the various models presented, it
suffers from the flaw that it sometimes obscures the dependency of the results
upon the assumptions, and even sometimes the understanding of a property or a
condition. I will just take two examples to illustrate this.
First, there is a small part of chapter 7 that deals with non-convexities and the
well-known problems that their existence pose for the functioning of competitive
markets. Yet nowhere is a definition of convexity, along with an explanation
of the problems that its violation poses for competitive markets, provided. As
a second example, the informal statement of the property of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) in the presentation of Arrow’s theorem in chapter 10
(p. 273) is vague, and, literally, incorrect. The authors indeed define IIA as the
requirement for the social ranking to be invariant with respect to the addition of
new alternatives to the agenda (“adding new options should not affect the initial
ranking of the old options”). Yet, the usual IIA in social choice theory is the
requirement for the social ranking between two alternatives to depend only upon
the individual rankings of these two alternatives. It is therefore a condition that
restricts the sensitivity of the social ranking to certain changes in the individual
preferences, and not a condition that restricts the sensitivity of the social ranking
to changes in the menu of available alternatives. While this particular “error” is not
dramatic (there are actually ways to formulate the original IIA that are closer to
what the authors refer to in their vague definition), I do think that it may introduce
some confusion in the reader’s mind, especially if this reader is an unexperienced
“advanced” undergraduate student who may have hard time in connecting the
author’s statement of IIA with the more conventional and precise one that can be
found in most textbooks that discuss Arrow’s theorem (see for instance Roemer,
1996, p. 22; Laffont, 1988, p. 98; Myles, 1995, p. 54 and, at the undergraduate
level, Feldman, 1980 p. 182-183).
It is always difficult to find the right balance between the requirement of
analytical rigor and that of introductory pedagogy. This is especially true of a
textbook that is precisely targeting an intermediate level audience. Yet, in my view,
and given the overall academic style that it has adopted, the book would have
gained somehow in being a bit more cautious with the handling of mathematics.
A strong point of the book is the good balance that it maintains throughout
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between two prevalent, but, until recently, quite isolated from each other, ap-
proaches to public economics: the “classical” approach and the ”political economy”
one. I mentioned earlier what I view as the main difference between the two
approaches. The classical approach considers public interventions as optimal,
from the viewpoint of some normative objective, corrective measures to specific
deficiencies associated with the functioning of the economy. It does not address the
issue of whether the individual actors (politicians, bureaucrats) who are involved
in the intervention have the incentive to perform the intervention, given their
own personal objective. By contrast, the “political economy” approach tries to
predict the type of public intervention that can be expected from the behavior of
individual actors involved in the public sector, given what can be assumed of their
objective, and of the institutional setting in which they operate. Both perspectives
are clearly important, and complementary.
It is unfortunate that the two approaches have developed until recently in
relative isolation from each other. Much is therefore to be expected from the recent
cross-fertilization of these two approaches that the recent trends in research have
initiated, and one can hope that textbooks like this one would contribute to this.
It is also unfortunate that these two approaches have sometimes served as
scientific caution to some non-scientific preconceived ideas about the merit of
public intervention and the optimal size of the state. As is well known to this
readership, the “political economy” approach has been very often associated with a
significant, and sometimes extreme, skepticism with respect to public intervention.
And it is true that the depiction of the public sector as a collection of budget-size
maximizing bureaucrats, re-election seeking politicians and rent-seeking lobbyists
that this approach provides does not contribute much to making one optimistic
about public intervention. At the other extreme, the naïvely simplistic vision of
the public sector as a benevolent agency in charge of maximizing some function
of the citizens’ well-beings that is provided by the classical approach bears some
responsibility for having made others overly optimistic about public intervention,
or for having given arguments to ideologically inclined “state interventionists”.
Yet, despite the obvious relevance of scientific knowledge for feeding ideo-
logical attitudes in the political debate, and the somewhat reciprocal fact that
ideological opinions may be a serious source of motivations for doing scientific
research, especially in the fields of public economics, it is I think important to leave
outside the strict domain of science ideological beliefs and statements. Textbooks
should be exemplary to that respect, because their primary aim is to provide
training to future scientists. While this book stands overall rather well on this
issue, it is not entirely faultless. On various occasions, one finds rather strong
statements of ideological nature. Two examples come to my mind.
First, in their brief discussion of public ownership of natural monopolies in a
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section of chapter 12 as a possible regulation devise, the authors write:
“Public ownership was practiced extensively in the UK and else-
where in Europe. All the major utilities including gas, telephones,
electricity, water and trains were taken into public ownership. This
policy was eventually undermined by the problems of lack of incen-
tives to innovate, invest or limit costs. Together these produced very
poor outcome with the lack of market forces producing industries
that were over-manned and inefficient. As a consequence, the UK
has undertaken a privatization program that has returned all these
industries to the private sector.” (p. 212)
This amalgamation of all the mentioned utility companies (whose cost structure
are very different, and who for this reason qualify quite differently for the status of
natural monopoly) is somewhat too crude. And as a matter of fact, many countries
have maintained public ownership on electricity (France and Canada), water
(Canada and US) and trains (almost all continental Europe) and the privatization
of electricity in the US has been the object of several controversies. There is still
much scientific debate about the pro and cons of privatization of utility companies
and I do not think that economic theory as it now stands provides us with such
a firm conclusion on this matter as that which would back this claim that gas,
telephones, electricity, water and trains should all be privatized.
Second, the authors start their section on “equity and distribution” by the
following rather provocative preamble:
“On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia. Pol
Pot began to implement his vision of Year Zero in which all inequalities
– of class, money, education, religion – would be eliminated. Driven
by their desire to achieve what they perceived as the social optimum
the Khmer Rouge attempted to engineer a return to a peasant economy.
In the process, they slaughtered an estimated two million people,
approximately one quarter of Cambodia’s population. The actions of
the Khmer Rouge are an extreme example of the pursuit of equality
and an immense reduction in economic output in order to achieve it.”
(p. 331)
While I leave to the reader the task of appreciating the relevance of the Khmer
Rouge genocide as the genuine example of what an egalitarian concern can be, at
least the example is telling of the type of feelings that this egalitarian concern is
inspiring to the authors.
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